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The number of historical works listed among the nearly 400-item bibliography in 
Mathematical Visions shows that the state of mathematics in 19th~century En- 
gland, and of geometry in particular, is not exactly a neglected subject in history 
of mathematics. A book which took such a large and complex subject, related it to 
English society of that time, and made some sort of unified sense out of the myriad 
of source materials and historical treatises would certainly be a book worthy of 
praise. I will attempt to explain why I believe that Visions is not such a book. The 
book’s thesis concerns the English “conceptual” approach to mathematics as 
opposed to a “formal” approach. Historians may disagree on what all the facts in 
a case are, and disagree on the interpretations of them, but a thesis such as this 
must be based on at least some agreed-upon facts in order for us to benefit from a 
useful discussion. However, too many of the facts in Visions appear to this re- 
viewer to be distorted in favor of the thesis. Thus, instead of discussing, for 
example, some interesting comparisons that might be made between this thesis 
and Pierre Duhem’s concerning the “ampleness of mind” of 19th-century British 
mathematical physicists [Duhem 19541, this review focuses on methodological 
matters: the presentation of certain key facts and the reasoning based on them. 
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The first problem is determining the scope of the subject: “This book is a study 
of changing views of geometry in the second half of the nineteenth century, when 
the silence which initially greeted Lobachevskii’s and B6lyai’s works was re- 
placed by a cacophony of diverse voices. . . . The aim is to trace the changing 
interpretations of geometrical truth in relation to a broader cultural context rather 
than to criticize, evaluate or interpret the ideas being propounded” (p. 6). A few 
paragraphs later we learn that the subject is actually the “reception and interpre- 
tation of the new geometrical theories in England” because “England defined a 
relatively small and homogeneous mathematical community with which to work.” 
In fact, in Visions the small, homogeneous mathematics community of Cambridge 
University is regarded as the group that, for the historian, defines the role of 
mathematics in English culture. There is no word of England’s “mathematical 
practitioners” and their disappearance as a self-identified group by 1840, as de- 
scribed in [Taylor 19661, or of the Spitalfields Mathematical Society (described in 
[Cassels 1979]), which, as its membership declined drastically, was absorbed by 
the Royal Astronomical Society in 1846. Instead the story in Visions begins in 
1818 with the small Cambridge group which called itself the Analytical Society. A 
fundamental transformation was taking place at this time, as E. G. R. Taylor has 
expressed it, “of the craftsman into the factory-hand, of the instrument-maker 
into the retailer, of the man of science into the salaried professor. The old personal 
links and identifications of inventor, maker and user were lost” [Taylor 1966, 
1051. This sort of large-scale societal change would seem to be highly relevant 
background to the status of geometry in Victorian society and to the epistemologi- 
cal discussions among the likes of Herschel, Whewell, and J. S. Mill. The talk of a 
“broader historical view” and a “broader cultural context” on this same page in 
Visions might well lead the reader to conclude that what will follow has some 
general significance. But instead English mathematics, and the Cambridge scene 
within it, are not meaningfully related to the broader context that helped to shape 
them. 
An early example occurs in a discussion of English “institutional contexts”: 
The London Mathematical Society was not founded until 1868, by which time the men 
initially identifiable in relation to the Analytical Society were too old to play a sustained role. 
In the Royal Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science, pure 
mathematics was not particularly encouraged; in the latter organization it shared section A 
with physics throughout the century. In short, as an autonomous study, pure mathematics 
was rather neglected. (p. 15) 
When we put alongside these facts the facts that in Germany the Deutsche Mathe- 
matiker-Vereinigung was established in 1891 and in France the SocietC Mathe- 
matique de France in 1872, and that previously pure mathematics had had much 
the same sort of institutional relationships in these countries as described here for 
England, the line of reasoning appears altogether too short. If England is properly 
compared with other countries it may have to be concluded either that there is 
nothing essentially English about the place of mathematics in English society or 
that the whole subject is so uniquely Victorian English as not to have any rele- 
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Vance to other cultures. Either conclusion would evidently clash with the motive 
for this study: “The swirl of implications attendant on new geometrical theories is 
obvious and explicit during this period. This makes nineteenth-century a particu- 
larly good field in which to explore the ways mathematical development interacts 
with its cultural context” (p. 8). It seems a fine line to walk: on the one hand 
geometry in Victorian England has to be interesting and important enough in itself 
to justify a study but, on the other, it cannot stand out as too distinctive or it runs 
the risk of being labeled as a special topic or, even worse, as of purely historical 
interest. 
Returning to the introduction, the scene begins to be set on page 1 with the 
statement that “most nineteenth-century philosophers perceived Euclidean geo- 
metrical axioms as descriptions of the fundamental properties of spatial reality. 
These axioms, and the theorems generated deductively from them, had a two-fold 
character. . . . they were indubitably true . . . [and] objectively impeccable” 
(p. 1). “Euclid’s geometry . . . was exactly true in the objective world; the 
properties of physical circles, triangles and of space itself were precisely what the 
theory predicted” (p. 2). No example of one of these philosophers is provided in 
the introduction and I could not think of one; but, as it turns out, there is no 
philosopher in the book who quite fits this description. 
The person represented as coming closest to holding this view seems to be 
William Whewell. However, in the paragraph leading up to the key Whewell quote 
the terminology gradually changes: from “real or conceptual subject matter” to, 
in the next sentence, the even broader “object being described.” At this distance 
from the original notion of “spatial reality” the reader is prepared for the actual 
quote in which Whewell refers not at all to definitions describing reality but rather 
defends “admissible” definitions as ones which “correspond to” or “refer to and 
agree with some conception” (p. 23). If no trouble is taken to distinguish concepts 
from reality then it is hard to see what hope there is of placing matters in the 
philosophical context of time. As it turns out this distinction has to be downplayed 
in order to fit the book’s theme of an epistemological clash between two visions of 
geometry: “descriptive” (geometrical objects are external to geometry, whether 
conceptual or real) and “formal” (they are not external to geometry). By the end 
of the book the term “conceptual” seems to be used interchangeably with “de- 
scriptive.” 
The thesis of Visions is that a descriptive/conceptual view dominated 19th- 
century England for a number of extramathematical as well as mathematical rea- 
sons. At the end of the 19th century “the establishment of a recognized and viable 
mathematical research community in England opened the door for a formal view 
of the subject. This view had not been viable within the nineteenth-century per- 
spective which kept mathematics essentially educational and insisted that its es- 
sence mirror all forms of human knowledge” (p. 244). Here again there is a fine 
line to walk in supporting this thesis. For one thing: there should be the mathemat- 
ical possibility of the formal view, while that formal view should be rejected by the 
dominant community. 
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The temptation for the historian defending such a thesis to fudge and provide a 
bit more weight here or ignore a troublesome nuance there, is ever present. The 
formal view is never satisfactorily described in Visions, and it has the appearance 
of a straw man. A major piece of evidence that the formal view was mathemati- 
cally possible during this time is said to be that it was held by the Scottish 
philosopher William Hamilton. He is described as claiming that “theorems gener- 
ated deductively from mathematical axioms were not substantially true . . . but 
merely the logical consequences of a hypothetical system” and that mathematics 
“had virtually no value as a part of the liberal education” (p. 22). But the litera- 
ture by G. E. Davie and Richard Olson, cited in the footnote on the same page, 
portrays Hamilton as an advocate of the traditional Scottish view of geometry as 
an essential part of a liberal education. A proper reading of Hamilton’s polemical 
unsigned “Review of [Whewell’s] Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as a Part 
of Liberal Education” (Edinburgh Review 62(1836), 409-455; not on the pages 
cited in Visions) requires realizing that he is making ironic use of the formalist 
view. Yet this summary of a caricature serves as a principal description in Visions 
of what the formal view of mathematics was supposed to be during this time. Is it 
possible to show that some formalist view was indeed considered tenable or are 
we merely to satisfy ourselves that, like imagining some non-Euclidean geometry, 
we can imagine such a view in Victorian England? If, as the conclusion of Visions 
suggests, the formalist view is best represented as leading to mathematical logic, 
then the argument would need to be made that the latter developed in England 
substantially after it developed elsewhere and that such a development was not 
due solely to internal, mathematical discoveries in England or elsewhere. Admit- 
tedly a tall order to fill, but such a comparison of different cultures is not even 
considered as an important factor in the argument. For example, the author has 
provided useful new aspects of Victorian geometry by addressing E. T. Dixon’s 
work and influence (or lack thereof). Dixon was one who was “willing to consider 
geometry as a purely formal study” (p. 193) in 1892. But were his faltering steps in 
this direction, and the less than welcoming reception his work got, an indication of 
any different situation from that on the Continent? The formalist period in mathe- 
matics is generally regarded as just beginning at about this time. 
Visions concludes with a prominent treatment of Russell’s Essay on the Fuun- 
dations of Geometry (1897) as, “in an important sense, . . . the culmination of the 
late nineteenth-century English geometrical tradition. In it Russell renegotiated 
the basic themes of descriptive geometry and conceptual truth which had defined 
the parameters of the English approach since the middle of the century” (p. 228). 
An elaborate comparison is made between parts of an 1895 manuscript by Russell 
entitled “Observations on Space and Geometry” and its later version in the first 
chapter of the Essay. Some background is given to the manuscript: “His ‘Obser- 
vations’ began with detailed criticisms of the work of two German metaphysi- 
cians, Heinrich Lotz and Franz Erhardt. Both of these men had defended neo- 
Kantian conceptual views of space against the empirical claims of Helmholtz and 
his followers” (p. 211). Here, instead of “Heinrich Lotz,” Hermann Lotze is 
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presumably intended since this is clear in the manuscript and in the Essay. Lotze 
is further described in the editorial apparatus to Volume 1 of The Collected Papers 
of Bertrand Russell (1983) which covers most of this material and is cited on page 
208 in Visions. 
The substantial presence of Lotze, Erhardt, and other foreigners is apparently 
taken simply as an example of how the Essay “took place in several intellectual 
traditions,” while “the earliest and, throughout, the strongest influence was the 
English epistemological tradition in which geometry was the descriptive study of 
an independently defined, conceptual subject matter” (p. 227). But this tradition 
has not been shown to be anything other than one way geometry has been con- 
ceived in Western societies since Euclid. What is taken here to be a sign of 
Russell’s adherence to a British descriptive/conceptual view, in contrast to mathe- 
maticians like E. T. Dixon and R. S. Ball, is due more to having a philosophical 
interest in geometry as the science of space. In other words, his principal focus 
was the philosophy of space, not geometry per se, and thus his view was necessar- 
ily descriptive/conceptual. The Essay was to be the first work in a Hegelian series 
of which the next would take up the science of time and matter in addition to 
space, i.e., dynamics. Russell’s program is summarized in a conference paper by 
Nicholas Griffin cited on page 210 of Visions and detailed in [Griffin 19901. 
As Richards would have it: “In the following decade Russell and Whitehead both 
abandoned the descriptive view of geometry defended in the Essay and together 
moved wholeheartedly into the formal development of logistics. Even as they 
moved in this direction, the institutional and intellectual tradition which had so 
long supported descriptive geometry in England faded away” (p. 229). For Rus- 
sell, at least, such an abandonment would have been tantamount to abandoning 
philosophy. Most observers would probably agree that there is a difference be- 
tween the Essay (1897) and Principia Muthematica (1910-1913) but no evidence is 
given here that this difference correlates in any way with an abandonment of a 
descriptive/conceptual view. When we read in Principia that “the universe con- 
sists of objects having various qualities and standing in various relations” [White- 
head & Russell 1910-1913 I, 431 and in Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy that “logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, 
though with its more abstract and general features” [Russell 1919, 1691, then it is 
surely not a case of a wholehearted change of view. 
G. H. Hardy’s A Mathematician’s Apology (first edition 1940) is cited to further 
support a “new mathematical vision”: “there is no scorn more profound, or on 
the whole more justifiable, than that of the men who make for the men who 
explain” (p. 240, quoted from [Hardy 1926, 61]), and so forth. Overlooking the 
fact that this was written when Hardy was in his sixties, here, as with the reading 
of William Hamilton above, an appreciation of British irony seems lacking: 
“These opening words,” the author comments, “are an unequivocal damnation of 
the value of seriously approaching mathematics in an educational context” (p. 
240). The footnote cites the 1982 edition of the Apology which includes a foreword 
by Hardy’s friend C. P. Snow providing a relevant context for the writing. Also, 
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when Hardy, in his 1926 Presidential address to the Mathematical Association an 
organization devoted to mathematics education, stated that “I believe also that a 
fair knowledge of mathematics is, even for those who have no pronounced mathe- 
matical talent, extremely useful and extremely stimulating, and that it should be 
part of the ordinary intellectual capital of all intelligent men” [Hardy 1926,66-671, 
then it is surely not a case of an unequivocal damnation of earlier educational 
values. 
The middle chapters of Visions combine straightforward accounts of the intro- 
duction of non-Euclidean and projective geometry into England with assertions of 
a Victorian need for a unified and descriptive view of the subject. The content and 
status of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos examinations were important indi- 
cators of the educational role of mathematics. The treatment of this subject would 
be something to look forward to after reading a review by the author of Victor 
Lowe’s biography of Whitehead in which Lowe is taken to task for rehashing “the 
well-worn complaints about the narrowness of the tripos and the inadequacy of 
British mathematics, particularly in comparison with Germany”: 
This picture, held almost universally by current mathematical historians, is largely gleaned 
from retrospective treatments by those who lived through this period. It is high time more 
scholarly research was devoted to the primary sources so that the era can be understood in 
broader terms than those of its frustrated adolescents. Catch phrases like “the Newtonian 
legacy” need to be seriously considered and carefully defined before an adequate understand- 
ing of late nineteenth-century Cambridge mathematics can be generated. [Richards 1987a, 
3171 
Suffice it so say there is essentially no new light shed on this subject in Visions and 
the sources used appear to be the same used by other current mathematical 
historians. One possible source of helpful information may be the manuscript 
minutes of the Special Board for Mathematics at Cambridge, which furnish re- 
ports on tripos performance and record motions and votes about the restructuring 
of the tripos from year to year. 
Some caution is needed in reading even the more straightforward parts of 
Visions. For example, on page 44, where the reader is referred “for a more 
detailed treatment of De Morgan’s development” to an article by the author. In 
this article a definition from De Morgan’s The Differential and Integral Calculus 
(1842) is given in which the clause occurs: “by making x sufficiently near to a we 
can make the function as near as we please to A” ([Richards 1987b, 251, quoting 
from [De Morgan 1842, 441). The comment on this is that “nowhere did he make 
the idea of ‘as near as we please to A’ more precise.” Yet on page 9 of his 
textbook De Morgan states: 
The following is exactly what we mean by a LIMIT. 
Let there by a symbol x which has different values depending on different successive 
suppositions of such a kind that any one of the suppositions being made, we can thence 
deduce the corresponding value of x: let the several values of x resulting from the different 
suppositions be 
alaZa,a4.. . .8zc 
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thenif. . . we continually approach to a certain quantity 1, so that each of the set differs from 
1 by less than its predecessors; and if, in addition to this, the approach to 1 is of such a kind, 
that name any quantity we may, however small, namely z, we shall at last come to a series 
beginning, say with a,, and continuing ad in@titum. 
a, a,+l an+2 . . . &c 
all the terms of which severally differ from 1 by less than t: then 1 is called the limit of x with 
respect to the supposition in question. [De Morgan 1842, 9; italics and small capitals by De 
Morgan] 
This long-winded but reasonably serviceable definition occurs in De Morgan’s 
Introductory Chapter, in which, the article asserts, he only discusses “the idea of 
the limit” [Richards 1987b, 241. The article argues that “for De Morgan the 
exactness of mathematical definitions, or their rigor, lay in the exact correlation of 
concept with definition” and that this is to be contrasted with Cauchy’s approach 
in which rigor “depended on the exactness with which the definitional structure 
could be used in proofs” [Richards 1987b, 251. Though evidence of De Morgan’s 
sympathetic knowledge of definitional formalism in algebra and the calculus is 
given in the articles and in Visions, the whole attempt to accumulate evidence on 
what are often rather fine distinctions may be called into question when a source 
can be so misrepresented. 
While none of us, and certainly not the present reviewer, is invulnerable to 
criticism, over all of us still stands, I hope, George Sarton’s old-fashioned dictum 
that the historian “must determine as accurately as possible the knowledge al- 
ready available on the topics. . . ; carry on his investigations with precision and 
thoroughness, making full use of the requisite methods and taking every precau- 
tion to avoid the various pitfalls” [Sarton 1957, 461. Trying to follow such stric- 
tures need not make broad cultural-historical studies any the less enjoyable. 
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